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Introduction
In a Republican presidential primary debate in 2011, United
States Representative Michele Bachmann brought the age-old vaccine
controversy into the national limelight when she said the vaccine that
prevents the sexually transmitted infection (STI) Human Papilloma
Virus (HPV) was “dangerous”—a surprisingly widespread sentiment
about vaccines in general. 1 Many states have proposed legislation to
make the HPV vaccine a mandatory prerequisite for children entering
school; Virginia and the District of Columbia have enacted such
legislation. 2 But for those who distrust vaccines, the HPV vaccine is
no exception. 3 Michele Boettiger, a Texas mother of three girls,
worried about the safety of the vaccine and the message sent
regarding sexual freedom, especially because her Roman Catholic
background taught her to “believe[ ] in abstinence until marriage.”4
Others have similar safety and religious concerns with vaccinations,
even compulsory school vaccinations. 5 Thus, many states allow
exemptions from mandatory school vaccinations, although the laws
vary widely. In some states, all a parent has to do is assert that
vaccines are contrary to their religious belief to receive an exemption. 6
1.

Denise Grady, Remark on Vaccine Could Ripple for Years, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 2011, at D1 (describing public health officials’ concerns
that Bachmann’s statements would decrease the already low numbers of
those using the HPV vaccine).

2.

See HPV Vaccine: State Legislation and Statutes, Nat’l Conference
of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/
hpv-vaccine-state-legislation-and-statutes.aspx (last updated Feb. 2013)
[hereinafter NCSL] (providing information on states that have proposed
and enacted mandatory HPV vaccine legislation, as well as proposed
legislation to repeal the enacted HPV legislation).

3.

Grady, supra note 1.

4.

Id.

5.

See, e.g., Steve Leblanc, Parents Use Religion to Avoid Vaccines, USA
Today (Oct. 10, 2007, 4:31 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
health/2007-10-18-religion-vaccines_N.htm (portraying Sabrina Rahim’s
fear that vaccination caused her son’s autism, which led her to sign a
letter claiming that, because of her deeply held religious beliefs, she
wanted her four-year-old son exempted from compulsory vaccinations so
he could enter preschool—even though Rahim does not practice any
specific faith); cf. Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why
Are So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 353, 413, 422 (2004) (naming several religious
groups that prohibit vaccinations for their members).

6.

Pediatrician Dr. Janet Levitan of Massachusetts counsels worried
parents to pursue a religious exemption because “[the law] says you have
to state that vaccination conflicts with your religious belief. It doesn’t
say you have to actually have that religious belief. So just state it.”
Leblanc, supra note 5.
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In other states, no exemptions are allowed. As new vaccines are
continuously developed, the nation’s long-standing and widespread
distrust of vaccinations, with concerns ranging from vaccine safety to
conscientious objection, seems to be on the rise. 7
New advances in technology have led to vaccines targeting viruses
such as the incurable but preventable HPV, an STI that has a strong
link to cervical, oral, and anogenital cancers as well as genital warts. 8
As public officials quickly convert these biomedical developments
from recommended vaccines, like the HPV vaccine, into mandatory
ones, which is where many state governments seem to be headed, new
legal frameworks need to be created. 9 But the formation of these new
legal frameworks raises central constitutional and policy questions,
including: (1) whether the Constitution requires states to provide
exemptions from compulsory vaccinations; (2) if the Constitution does
not require exemptions, whether states should provide those
exemptions; and (3) if states do provide exemptions, what the legal
framework should be. The United States Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the constitutionality of mandatory versus
7.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National
Immunization Survey found that in 2008 nearly 40 percent of American
parents refused or delayed giving their young children at least one
vaccine shot, which was a significant increase from 22 percent in 2003.
Liz Szabo, Refusing Kids’ Vaccine More Common Among Parents, USA
Today (May 3, 2010, 8:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/
health/2010-05-04-vaccines04_ST_N.htm. Additionally, a quarter of
American parents believe vaccines cause autism. Id. Whether vaccines
actually cause autism is a source of controversy. Compare David
Kirby, Evidence of Harm: Mercury in Vaccines and the Autism
Epidemic: A Medical Controversy, at xii (2005) (discussing
mercury and thimerosal content in vaccines and the suspected link to
autism), with Paul A. Offit, Autism’s False Prophets: Bad
Science, Risky Medicine, and the Search for a Cure 36–46
(2008) (describing research debunking the theory that vaccination
causes autism, and explaining why parents believe the “vaccine causes
autism” narrative).

8.

Lauri E. Markowitz et al., Quadrivalent Human Papillomavirus Vaccine:
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP), Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep., Mar. 23,
2007, at 1, 1; see also Gardiner Harris, Panel Endorses HPV Vaccines
for Boys of 11, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2011, at A1 (identifying other
cancers linked to HPV).

9.

The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)
recommends routine vaccination of three doses for girls beginning at age
nine and catch-up vaccination for unvaccinated females aged thirteen to
twenty-six. See Press Briefing Transcript: ACIP Recommends All
Eleven- to Twelve-Year-Old Males Get Vaccinated Against HPV, Ctrs.
for Disease Control and Prevention (Oct. 25, 2011, 12:45 PM),
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2011/t1025_hpv_12yroldvaccine.html
(describing the most recent ACIP recommendations).
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permissive exemptions from compulsory vaccination laws. 10 Because
case law, legislation, administrative decisions, and scholarly discourse
regarding exemptions from compulsory vaccination laws offer few
concrete conclusions, 11 this issue requires further analysis.
This Note addresses exemptions from compulsory vaccination
laws. Part I provides historical context to the age-old vaccine
controversy and introduces current-day issues that add another layer
of complexity to the vaccine narrative. Part II lays out the relevant
legal principles that govern compulsory vaccination laws: the Supreme
Court public health and free exercise jurisprudence as well as the
state statutory frameworks. Part III describes the overly broad
interpretations of the Supreme Court jurisprudence at the lower court
level and the lower courts’ confusion in addressing the
constitutionality of a free exercise exemption. Part IV explores four
avenues, advocating for the one that allows for exemptions in a
certain set of circumstances. Part V sets up a novel three-tiered legal
framework that addresses the law-medicine, constitutional, and policy
levels of analysis.
Examination of these issues requires balancing the tension
between constitutional law and public health law—and more
specifically, individual liberty and police power. The Institute of
Medicine (IOM) defines public health as “what we, as a society, do
collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy.” 12 This
broad definition clearly encompasses mandatory vaccination laws. 13
Mandatory vaccination advocates often quote the common law maxim
10.

See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (holding that
compulsory vaccination laws fall within a state’s police powers);
Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Schs., 739 F. Supp. 2d 273, 283 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (“Neither the . . . Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has directly addressed whether a religious objector is
constitutionally exempt from a program of mandatory vaccination.”).

11.

See infra Part II.C; see also William P. Marshall, The Case Against the
Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 357, 400 (1990) (arguing against the constitutionally compelled
free-exercise exemption because it “sets forth a false dichotomy between
secular and religious belief systems and ignores the similarity of their
functions . . . in the political and social environment”); Daniel A.
Salmon & Andrew W. Siegel, Religious and Philosophical Exemptions
from Vaccination Requirements and Lessons Learned from Conscientious
Objectors from Conscription, 116 Pub. Health Rep. 289, 292 (2001)
(arguing for the free-exercise exemption in the context of compulsory
vaccination laws using conscientious objection from conscription as a
model); infra Part III.

12.

Comm. for the Study of the Future of Pub. Health, The
Future of Public Health 19 (1988).

13.

Ian Glynn & Jenifer Glynn, The Life and Death of Smallpox
135–42 (2004).
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salus populi suprema lex est, “the welfare of the people is the supreme
law,” to uphold a wide scope for the state’s police power. 14 But just as
vaccinations have been prevalent for centuries, antivaccinationism is
“as old as vaccination itself.” 15 Compulsory vaccination involves
invasive medical technology that has potential risks. Thus, a more
sophisticated legal framework needs to be established to accommodate
new biomedical developments that are present in vaccination
technology.

I.

Defining the Problem: The Vaccine Controversy

Resistors to vaccines have often thought of vaccinations as a
“greater risk to life and limb” than getting sick. 16 Although creating a
framework where vaccinationists and public health advocates are the
heroes and antivaccinationists are the villains may be easier, the
narrative of the vaccine controversy is far more complex. 17 The
earliest anti-vaccine campaigns date back as far as the earliest
mandatory vaccine campaigns. 18 Although English physician Edward
Jenner’s first experiments with smallpox vaccination took place in
1796, vaccination entered into American discourse with the smallpox
outbreaks in the United States in 1898. 19 State and local governments
responded to those outbreaks by campaigning and requiring citizens
to submit to vaccinations, which caused antivaccination movements
across the nation. 20
In 1901, Cleveland made national news when its health officer,
Martin Friedrich, who led vaccination campaigns across the city, 21
14.

Michael Willrich, Pox 301 (2011).

15.

Id. at 262 (noting that antivaccine protests began two years before the
first vaccination was performed in the United States).

16.

Id. at 12.

17.

Compare Gregory A. Poland & Robert M. Jacobson, The Age-Old
Struggle Against the Antivaccinationists, 364 New Eng. J. Med. 97, 98
(2011) (describing anti-vaccinationists as scientifically ignorant or
radical extremists who deliberately misguide the public through false
data and violence), with Willrich, supra note 14, at 344–45 (warning
readers to be cautious about judging the “innumerable people” around
the world who greet scientific innovation with “skepticism, resentment,
or steadfast resistance,” because “[t]o dismiss so many people as merely
ignorant and irrational is worse than intolerant”).

18.

Willrich, supra note 14, at 39.

19.

Id. at 21.

20.

Id. at 39 (noting that early compulsory vaccination efforts ran up
against “strong, even violent, antivaccination movements”).

21.

Compulsory vaccination was the national policy in Friedrich’s native
country of Germany. Id. at 238.
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became “a reluctant hero of the antivaccination movement.” 22 After
witnessing individuals whom he had compelled to be vaccinated fall ill
and die of tetanus, Friedrich stopped the vaccinations and ordered all
patients infected with smallpox to be isolated from the overall
population.23 Instead of using vaccinations, Friedrich disinfected homes
in the city with formaldehyde generators for months, and by the end of
1901 he seemed to have smallpox controlled. 24 Unfortunately, the success was temporary. 25 A homeless man from New Jersey entered
Cleveland and swept the city with smallpox a year later; in the end,
Friedrich cautiously tested vaccines for safety and reliability and finally
stamped out the smallpox after two more years. 26 Thus, it was not only
“old cranks” and “radicals” who had concerns about vaccinations—as
many vaccination proponents claimed.
Despite public unrest with the idea of compulsory vaccinations,
by 1942 nine states and the Territory of Alaska had enacted laws
mandating vaccinations for diphtheria. 27 From 1958 to 1965, all fifty
states enacted new legislation requiring school children to undergo
vaccination for smallpox and other diseases. 28 But by 1971 there had
been “no reported cases of smallpox in the United States in more than
twenty years, [causing] the annual tally of six to eight deaths from
complications of vaccination [to become] increasingly unacceptable.” 29
As such, the U.S. Public Health Service recommended discontinuation
of childhood vaccination against smallpox. 30 “Within three years,
every . . . state had repealed its smallpox vaccination mandate for
schoolchildren.” 31 Even with the rise and fall in public trust of
vaccines, mandatory school vaccines have been required for years and
22.

Id. at 239 (noting that Friedrich felt that vaccines were “unreliable at
best, toxic at worst”); see also Martin Friedrich, How We Rid Cleveland
of Smallpox, 1 Clev. Med. J. 77, 88 (1902) (“A man would have to
have a heart of stone if he would not melt at the sight of the misery
[vaccines] produce.”).

23.

Willrich, supra note 14, at 239.

24.

Friedrich, supra note 22, at 89.

25.

Willrich, supra note 14, at 239.

26.

Id. at 240.

27.

Charles L. Jackson, State Laws on Compulsory Immunization in the
United States, 84 Pub. Health Rep. 787, 788 (1969).

28.

Id. at 789.

29.

Willrich, supra note 14, at 339.

30.

The U.S. Public Health Service instead recommended smallpox vaccinations only for those adults or children who would be traveling to
smallpox-prone areas. C. Henry Kempe, The End of Routine Smallpox
Vaccination in the United States, 49 Pediatrics 489, 489–92 (1972).

31.

Willrich, supra note 14, at 340.
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are associated with successful reduction of infectious disease and
establishment of herd immunity, which occurs when a threshold of
vaccinated individuals is reached so that others may not need to be
vaccinated to maintain a population of healthy individuals. 32
Compulsory school vaccination laws did not force children to get
vaccinated; they only prevented unvaccinated children from being
permitted to enroll in a public school. 33 This form of compulsion,
however, leaves parents with only a few options, like homeschooling
or private school—neither of which may be desirable. Thus, these
issues have been especially important to parents. 34 The enacted and
proposed compulsory vaccination program laws vary widely and are
inconsistent in their application: some do not speak to exemptions at
all and others allow medical, religious, or philosophical exemptions.35
Some courts hold that there is no right to a religious exemption from
mandatory school vaccinations, while others state that there is such a
constitutional right. 36

II. Mandatory Vaccination and Free Exercise Legal
Framework
The current legal framework for analyzing religious exemptions
from mandatory school vaccination laws is composed of (1) the
Supreme Court’s case law on public health, (2) the Court’s case law
on free exercise and religion, and (3) each state’s statutes governing
compulsory school vaccination laws. Each of these legal components,
including their inadequacies, is discussed below.
A.

The Supreme Court’s Public Health Jurisprudence

When analyzing a challenge to mandatory vaccinations, most
courts and legal scholars point to the foundational early twentieth32.

See Jacob Heller, The Vaccine Narrative 11 (2008) (discussing
and explaining herd immunity); see also Alan R. Hinman et al.,
Childhood Immunization: Laws That Work, 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics
122, 125 (2002) (describing the concept of herd immunity by discussing
how “[m]ost vaccines provide . . . protection” through vaccinating “a
large enough proportion of individuals” so as to “indirectly [protect
individuals] who are not immunized”).

33.

Willrich, supra note 14, at 229.

34.

See Leblanc, supra note 5 (showing the extent to which a parent may go
to avoid vaccination but still get his or her child into preschool).

35.

Kathleen S. Swendiman, Cong. Res. Serv., RS21414, Mandatory
Vaccinations: Precedent and Current Laws 3 (2011).

36.

See Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Schs., 739 F. Supp. 2d 273, 283
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (listing court decisions supporting the right to a
religious exemption from compulsory school vaccination and decisions
holding the opposite); see also infra Part III.
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century Supreme Court case Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 37 In Jacobson,
the Massachusetts legislature had enacted a vaccination statute to
protect against smallpox. 38 This statute addressed an increase in
smallpox in the city of Cambridge and required inhabitants to be
vaccinated. 39 Reverend Henning Jacobson of the Swedish Lutheran
Church refused to be vaccinated because his son had suffered negative
results from vaccines in the past. 40 The Supreme Court held that public
health and public safety laws fall under the umbrella of a state’s police
power—a major holding that serves as the foundation of public health
jurisprudence. 41 Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the Massachusetts
statute requiring Cambridge inhabitants to be vaccinated against
smallpox, concluding that the legislation was a valid exercise of the
state’s police power and not an invasion of any constitutional rights. 42
The second Supreme Court case on compulsory vaccination laws,
Zucht v. King, was decided in 1922. 43 In Zucht, Texas public officials
excluded a girl from both a public and a private school because she
did not have the required vaccination certificate and refused to be
vaccinated. 44 The Supreme Court extended the Jacobson holding to
allow for mandatory vaccination as a prerequisite to school attendance. 45 The Court stated that municipal officials had “broad
discretion in matters affecting the application and enforcement of a
health law.” 46 The Court distinguished Zucht’s case from Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 47 in which the Court concluded that the public officials
administrating an ordinance had an “unequal and oppressive” intent
when they denied 200 petitions for waivers by Chinese persons and

37.

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).

38.

Id. at 12–13.

39.

Id. at 12.

40.

Id. at 17 (both Jacobson and his son had experienced illness following
previous vaccinations, which Jacobson argued was proof of a hereditary
condition that would cause their systems to “rebel against the
introduction of the vaccine”).

41.

Id. at 24–25 (“According to settled principles the police power of a State
must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public
health and the public safety.”).

42.

Id. at 38.

43.

Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).

44.

Id. at 175.

45.

Id. at 176 (explaining that compulsory vaccination falls under the state’s
police power).

46.

Id. (citing Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905)).

47.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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only denied one petition by a non-Chinese person. 48 The Court differentiated Zucht from Yick Wo, as Yick Wo held that the officials
exercised arbitrary power and denied the plaintiff equal protection of
laws, 49 whereas the Zucht Court stated that there was “broad discretion
required for the protection of the public health,” and upheld the
compulsory vaccination ordinance. 50 The Zucht Court offered a cursory
analysis with little insight as to the limitations of the Jacobson
decision. 51 But Zucht and Jacobson are the bases for state and local
mandatory school vaccination laws. 52 But it is unclear what the impact
on the Court’s public health jurisprudence would be if a plaintiff, like
Jacobson, came forward with a free exercise challenge that a mandatory
vaccine violated his or her sincerely held religious belief. Perhaps the
outcome would be different under such circumstances.
B.

The Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Jurisprudence

This Note will focus on parental claims to religious exemptions
under the Free Exercise Clause from mandatory vaccinations for their
children. The First Amendment begins: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” 53 A number of organized religious sects object to mandatory
vaccination: the Amish, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Christian Scientists,
among others. 54 But whether or not the religious grounds are based on
doctrines of organized belief is irrelevant. 55 Rather, courts look at the
sincerity of the person’s belief, not the truth of that belief. 56 Although
48.

Id. at 373–74 (finding a denial of equal treatment where the ordinance
required laundries without waivers to be located in certain types of
buildings).

49.

Id.

50.

260 U.S. at 177 (“Unlike Yick Wo v. Hopkins . . . these ordinances
confer not arbitrary power . . . .”).

51.

Id. at 176–77.

52.

See infra Parts III.B, III.C, III.D.

53.

U.S. Const. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause has been applied to
the states through its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

54.

Cf. Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 356, 423, 430 (describing the pockets of
religious groups that opted out of vaccinations).

55.

See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713–14 (1981) (“[R]eligious
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”).

56.

See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944)
(concluding that “the District Court ruled properly when it withheld
from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious
beliefs or doctrines of respondents” because “[m]en may believe what
they cannot prove”).
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these themes have been consistent, free exercise jurisprudence has
evolved with Supreme Court decisions over the years.
1.

The Definition of Religion

The primary context in which the Supreme Court has considered
the definition of religion has been decisions regarding the
conscientious-objector exemption from the military draft, rather than
in the public health context. Early on, the Court rejected students’
claims for religious exemption from university military training
courses in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, stating
that conscientious-objector status was a privilege that came “not from
the Constitution but from the acts of Congress.” 57 Subsequently, in
United States v. Seeger, 58 the Court interpreted a section of the
Universal Military Training and Selective Service Act exempting
individuals “who, by reason of religious training and belief, [are]
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.” 59 The
Act defined “religious training and belief” as “an individual’s belief in
a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code.” 60
In Seeger, the Court considered three consolidated cases involving
applicants who sought a religious exemption from the military draft
but did not necessarily believe in a “Supreme Being.” 61 The Court
ultimately held that “the test of belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place
in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.” 62 Thus, the Court
broadly included the applicants’ nontheistic views into the Act’s
definition of religion.
Welsh v. United States also involved an applicant seeking an
exemption from the draft under the Act; however, this individual
crossed out “religious training” on his form. 63 Justice Black’s plurality
57.

Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934)
(“[Congress] may grant or withhold the exemption as . . . it sees fit;
and if it be withheld, the native-born conscientious objector cannot
successfully assert the privilege.”).

58.

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).

59.

50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (2006).

60.

Id.

61.

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165–69.

62.

Id. at 165–66 (internal quotation omitted).

63.

Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 337 (1970) (noting that while
“religious training” was struck from Welsh’s application because of his
uncertainty regarding the existence of a Supreme Being, his “deep
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opinion in Welsh concluded that Seeger was still controlling because
the individual “strongly believed that killing in war was wrong,
unethical, and immoral, and [his] conscience[ ] forbade [him] to take
part in such an evil practice.” 64 Black continued,
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are
purely ethical or moral in source and content but that
nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain
from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs
certainly occupy in the life of that individual “a place parallel to
that filled by . . . God” in traditionally religious persons. 65

In both Seeger and Welsh, there was no doubt as to the depth and
sincerity of the individuals’ beliefs as a conscientious objector. 66 Thus,
in these cases, the Court extended a broad definition of religion that
protected exemptions based on sincere moral convictions, regardless of
whether they were grounded in religion or philosophy. However,
Gillette v. United States interpreted the Act as allowing exemptions
only for those who conscientiously object to all war and not to a
particular war, and for this reason rejected the plaintiff’s request for
conscientious-objector status. 67
These conscientious-objector exemption cases, although far from
specific and instructive, provide courts and state legislatures with a
starting point for how to approach defining a religious exemption.68
Although conscientious-objection exemptions from the military draft
are not identical to religious exemptions from compulsory vaccination
laws, the approach for granting conscientious-objection status has
valuable similarities and lessons. 69

conscientious scruples against taking part in wars where people were
killed” was nevertheless certain).
64.

Id.

65.

Id. at 340.

66.

Id. at 337.

67.

Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). The Gillette Court
rejected the conscientious objector status claim because “Congress
intended to exempt persons who oppose participating in all war . . .
and that persons who object solely to participation in a particular war
are not within the [exemption’s purview], even though the latter
objection may have such roots . . . that it is ‘religious’ in character.” Id.
at 447.

68.

See, e.g., Salmon & Siegel, supra note 11, at 289 (providing a
foundation for the application of conscientious objection from conscription to exemption from compulsory vaccination laws).

69.

See infra Part III.B.
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2.

The Smith Standard

A crucial controversy in free exercise jurisprudence that is also
applicable to religious exemption claims is the level of scrutiny to
apply. This Note will argue that the level of scrutiny should vary with
respect to different vaccines and will suggest a certain standard. But
first an examination of the current legal state of scrutiny analysis in
free exercise claims is necessary.
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court held that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate standard for evaluating laws burdening
religious freedom. 70 This case arose from a state’s denial of unemployment benefits to a woman who was a member of the Seventh-day
Adventist Church and quit her job instead of working on the Saturday
Sabbath. 71 The Court concluded that denying benefits imposed a
substantial burden on her because it forced her to choose between her
income and her faith. 72 The issue was whether there was a compelling
government interest that the statute’s religious eligibility provisions
promoted, which justified substantially impinging her First Amendment
right.73 The Court held that there was no compelling interest, and so
denying benefits violated the plaintiff’s free exercise rights. 74
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v.
Smith, 75 which some argue drastically shrank the power and scope of
the Free Exercise Clause. 76 In Smith, two individuals were fired by a
private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote,
a hallucinogenic drug, as part of a religious ritual for the Native
American Church. 77 Because they were fired for “misconduct,” Oregon
denied them unemployment benefits. 78 Oregon law prohibited the
“knowing or intentional possession” of a “controlled substance” unless
a medical practitioner authorized and prescribed such usage, with no
70.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).

71.

Id. at 399–400.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.

Id. at 406–07.

75.

Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

76.

Some scholars argue that Smith was not such a shift from precedent,
while others disagree. Compare Marci A. Hamilton, Employment
Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, the Litigants,
and the Doctrinal Discourse, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1671, 1674 (2011),
with Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of
Disrespect, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 519, 575 (1994) (stating that the
Smith Court “chose . . . to promote an advocacy of intolerance”).

77.

494 U.S. at 874.

78. Id.
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exception for religiously inspired use. 79 The Court decided that the
Free Exercise Clause allowed the state to prohibit peyote use even for
religious purposes; thus, the Court upheld the denial of unemployment benefits. 80 More generally, Smith held that the Free Exercise
Clause cannot be used to challenge a neutral law of general
applicability. 81 Under this holding, even if a law burdens religious
practices, so long as the law does not single out religious practices for
punishment and is not motivated by the desire to interfere with
individuals’ right to practice religion, it is likely constitutional.
The Supreme Court interpreted and applied Smith in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. 82 In Hialeah, the
Court held that a city ordinance, which barred “[killing, slaughtering,
or sacrificing] animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or
not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed,” 83 was
unconstitutional because its obvious purpose was to prohibit a
religious practice. 84 The Court reaffirmed Smith, stating that a neutral
and generally applicable law does not have to be “justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” 85 But if a law does
not satisfy the Smith requirements, then enforcement of the law has
to be “narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” 86
The City of Hialeah enacted the ordinance in response to the
Santeria Church’s announcement that it was establishing a school,
cultural center, and museum to bring its practices (including ritual
sacrifice) into the open. 87 The ordinance specifically referred to
“sacrifice” and “ritual” and made exceptions for other types of animal
sacrifice. 88 Thus, the Court concluded that the law lacked neutrality
because its objective was to stop the practice of the Santeria
religion. 89 The Court also ruled that the law was not one of “general
79.

Id. at 874, 876.

80.

Id. at 890.

81.

Id. at 879.

82.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).

83.

Id. at 527.

84.

Id. at 526 (noting that the ordinance was enacted in reaction to moral
concerns by certain residents of the city against Santeria).

85.

Id. at 531 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 872).

86.

Id. at 531–32.

87.

Id. at 526.

88.

Id. at 536–37 (pointing out exemptions in the ordinance, including one
for kosher slaughter, which acted as a “gerrymander” that targeted only
the Santeria religion).

89.

Id. at 534–35.
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applicability,” because even though “the city’s proffered interest”
included preventing animal cruelty, ensuring sanitary disposal of
animal carcasses, and avoiding the consumption of uninspected
meat, 90 the ordinance did not prohibit other animal killings besides
religious sacrifice. 91 Since the government could achieve its goals
without burdening the Santeria practices, the law was unconstitutional. 92 Therefore, after Smith and its application in Hialeah, free
exercise rights are not violated by a neutral law of general
applicability unless rational basis review is not satisfied; conversely, a
law not of general applicability would be found unconstitutional if it
did not meet strict scrutiny.
3.

The Hybrid-Rights Exception to Smith

Relevant to the issue of religious exemptions for vaccinations,
the Supreme Court has denied free exercise rights and allowed religious
exemptions in certain contexts. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held
that Amish parents had the right to an exemption from compulsory
school laws for their fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children under the
Free Exercise Clause. 93 The Court said that the Amish objected to
education beyond the eighth grade because what is taught in schools
is in “marked variance” with Amish values and ways of life. 94 The
Court found that the compulsory attendance laws infringed on the
Amish parents’ rights to control the upbringing of their children and
that “the traditional way of life” for the Amish was not a matter of
“personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by
an organized group, and intimately related to daily living.” 95 The
Court concluded that the Wisconsin law “affirmatively” compelled the
Amish parents, “under threat of criminal sanction,” to act in a way
“at odds with . . . their religious beliefs” and destroyed their free
exercise rights. 96 Therefore, Yoder applied a strict scrutiny standard
in this case in favor of the Amish parents. 97
The majority in Smith distinguished Smith from Yoder and other
cases in which strict scrutiny had been the standard by saying the

90.

Id. at 543–45.

91.

Id. at 543.

92.

Id. at 546 (finding that the government could narrow the ordinance to
achieve the same interests without placing a large burden on religion).

93.

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 235 (1972).

94.

Id. at 210–11.

95.

Id. at 216.

96.

Id. at 218–19.

97.

Id. at 215.
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latter were “hybrid” cases. 98 These hybrid-rights cases included claims
in which a free exercise action was connected with other assertions of
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech or the right of
parents to direct the education of their children. 99 The Smith majority
deemed those types of cases as ones in which to apply the strict
scrutiny standard. 100 But cases that were not considered hybrid and
claimed exemptions from a neutral, generally applicable law would
not be evaluated under that high standard. 101
In the wake of Smith, courts have ruled that simply adding
another constitutional claim to a free exercise claim does not
necessarily implicate strict scrutiny analysis. 102 The Court in Smith
cited Prince v. Massachusetts, 103 a case that contained both a freeexercise and an equal-protection claim. 104 The case also addressed the
tension between public health law and free-exercise claims. 105 The
Prince Court upheld Massachusetts’s child labor regulations against a
woman who allowed her children to distribute and sell magazines that
98.

Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion in Smith examined the cases in which free-exercise
challenges were upheld and revealed that none involved only freeexercise claims alone. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
121 (1943) (invalidating a flat license tax on solicitations when it was
applied to religious disseminations because it infringed upon the free
exercise of religion and freedom of speech and of the press); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304–07 (1940) (striking down a licensing
system that affected religious solicitations because it violated both the
Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment).

99.

494 U.S. at 881–82; see, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218-19 (striking down
application of compulsory school-attendance laws to Amish parents
because it violated both the parents’ freedom of religion and their
liberty to control the education of their children under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments).

100. 494 U.S. at 882–83.
101. Id. at 884.
102. See, e.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999); Swanson
v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998);
compare Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681
(N.D. Tex. 2000) (applying rational basis review to a challenge against
school uniforms based on the free exercise claim and the right of parents
to control the upbringing of their children), with Hicks v. Halifax Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (applying strict
scrutiny instead).
103. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), cited in Smith, 494 U.S.
at 879–80.
104. Id. at 164.
105. Id. at 166–67 (“The right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or
the latter to ill health or death.”) (emphasis added).

883

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013
Giving Families Their Best Shot

preached the works of Jehovah’s Witnesses on the street. 106 Prince
stated that “Massachusetts has determined that an absolute
prohibition, though one limited to streets and public places and to the
incidental uses proscribed, is necessary to accomplish its legitimate
objectives.” 107 These objectives included “[a]cting to guard the general
interest in youth’s well being . . . as parens patriae.” 108 Although the
Supreme Court had not yet clearly and definitively utilized the
doctrine of strict scrutiny as of Prince, this language is similar to
what the Court later called “strict scrutiny.” 109 Because there is
currently precedent that hybrid-rights claims may potentially fail
even in the face of strict scrutiny, the idea that the hybrid-rights
exception would swallow the rule, as suggested by some judges and
commentators, should not cause significant alarm. 110 Nothing in
practice would be altered.
106. Id. at 162.
107. Id. at 170; see also id. at 173–74 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“The burden
was . . . on . . . Massachusetts to prove the reasonableness and
necessity of prohibiting children from engaging in [this type of religious
activity and] . . . [i]f the right . . . to practice . . . religion in that
manner is to be forbidden by constitutional means, there must be
convincing proof that such a practice constitutes a grave and immediate
danger to the state or to the health, morals or welfare of the child.”).
108. Id. at 166.
109. The strict scrutiny standard was initially implied in the famous footnote
four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938): “There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution . . . which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” However, the formalized strict scrutiny analysis did not fully develop until decades after
1942. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand.
L. Rev. 793, 799–800 (2006) (“The Supreme Court first used the precise
term ‘strict scrutiny’ in 1942’s Skinner v. Oklahoma . . . [but] in the
development of constitutional doctrine in the decades after Skinner,
Justice Douglas’s phrase caught on and eventually became increasingly
formalized into a two ‘prong’ test now referred to as ‘strict scrutiny’
. . . analysis.”).
110. Justice Souter raised the concern that “[i]f a hybrid claim is simply one
in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid
exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule.”
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring). This Note and other
commentators conclude that a higher standard for the implication of
another constitutional right ameliorates this concern. See Steven H.
Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the
Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception”, 108
Penn St. L. Rev. 573, 588 (2003) (“[T]he approach utilized by the
Ninth Circuit requiring plaintiffs to plead a colorable companion claim
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But the fact that the analysis in Prince seems very close to strict
scrutiny presents another twist. Justice Scalia used Prince to support
his holding in Smith. 111 But as has been described above and as
Justice O’Connor pointed out in her Smith concurrence, 112 the Court
rejected claims like the one in Prince only after carefully considering
the competing interests. 113 Therefore, the standard in Prince was not
one of rational basis review but more like strict scrutiny. 114 The fact
that the majority in Smith uses Prince as an example in support of
rejecting exemptions from laws of neutral and general applicability is
confusing. Thus, as has already been described and will be further
examined, whether the strict scrutiny standard or Smith’s seemingly
rational basis review would apply and the availability of the hybridrights exception became questions that lower courts had difficulty
applying. 115
C.

The States’ Current Statutory Framework

The third source of law that governs mandatory vaccination cases
is each state’s statutory framework. Each state has varying statutes
that require certain vaccines, and some provide for religious and
philosophical exemptions. 116 All states allow medical exemptions. 117
These apply, for instance, if a student has a compromised immune
would seem to blunt much of the force of Justice Souter’s critique of
Smith’s hybrid claim exception.”).
111. Justice Scalia wrote: “Subsequent decisions have consistently held
that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Emp’t Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also id. at 880 (“We found no constitutional infirmity in excluding
[these children] from doing there what no other children may do.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
112. Id. at 896 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
113. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
114. Id. at 170 (finding a “legitimate” government interest and the necessity
of the prohibition); cf. Sarah L. Dunn, Note, The “Art” of Procreation:
Why Assisted Reproduction Technology Allows for the Preservation of
Female Prisoners’ Right to Procreate, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2561, 2567
n.45 (2002) (stating that Prince used strict scrutiny analysis).
115. See infra Part V.B.
116. See Appendix. Table 1 lists the statutory requirements in each of the
states and provides an overview of the states’ requirements for
compulsory school vaccination laws and the exemptions that are
allowed.
117. See NCSL, supra note 2 (describing the exemptions that apply under
state statutes).
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system, an allergy to a vaccine, an illness at the time of vaccination,
or medical contraindications to vaccines. 118 Almost all states and the
District of Columbia currently allow religious exemptions 119 —only
Mississippi and West Virginia do not. 120 Philosophical exemptions are
provided by seventeen states. 121

118. Id. (describing the scenarios in which the medical exemptions apply).
119. Ala. Code § 16-30-3 (2012); Alaska Admin. Code tit. 4, § 06.055
(2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-873 (2009); Ark. Code Ann.
§ 6-18-702 (2007); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120365 (West
2012); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-4-903 (2012); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 10-204a (West 2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 131 (2007); D.C.
Code § 38-506 (LexisNexis 2007); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1003.22 (West
2012); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-771 (2012); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 2302A1156 (2011); Idaho Code Ann. § 39-4802 (2011); 105 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5/27-8.1 (West 2012); Ind. Code Ann. § 21-40-5-6 (West 2008);
Iowa Code § 139A.8 (2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-5209 (2002); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 214.036 (West 2006); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 17:170(E) (2001); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20A, § 6355 (2008); Md.
Code Ann., Educ. § 7-403 (LexisNexis 2008); Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
76, § 15 (West 2009); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.9215 (West
2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 121A.15 (West 2008); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 167.181 (West 2010); Mont. Code Ann. § 20-5-405 (2011); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 79-221 (2008); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 392.437 (West
2011); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141-C:20-c (2005); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 26:1A09.1 (West 2007); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-5-3 (2006); N.Y. Pub.
Health Law § 2164 (McKinney 2012); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 130A-155 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 23-07-17.1 (2012); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.671 (West 2005); Okla. Stat. tit. 70,
§ 1210.192 (2010); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 433.267 (West 2011); 24
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-303a (West 2006); R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-38-2
(2001); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-29-180 (2012); S.D. Codified Laws
§ 13-28-7.1 (2004); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-5001 (2009); Tex. Educ.
Code Ann. § 38.001(c)(1)(B) (West 2006); Utah Code Ann. § 53A11-302 (West 2004); Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1122 (2012); Va. Code Ann.
§ 32.1-46(D)(1) (2011); Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.210.090 (2012); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 252.04 (West 2009); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-309 (West
2011).
120. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-23-37 (2009) (does not provide for religious
exemption); W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-3-4 (LexisNexis 2011) (same).
121. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-873 (2009); Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 120365 (West 2012); Idaho Code Ann. § 39-4802 (2011); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:170(E) (2001); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20A, § 6355
(2008); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.9215 (West 2012); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 121A.15 (West 2008); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-221 (2011);
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 23-07-17.1 (2012); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 3313.671 (West 2005); Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 1210.192 (2010); Tex.
Educ. Code Ann. § 38.001(c)(1)(B) (West 2006); Utah Code Ann.
§ 53A-11-302 (West 2004); Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1122 (2012); Wash.
Rev. Code § 28A.210.090 (2012); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 252.04 (West
2009).
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III. Lower Court Decisions in Disarray:
To Exempt or Not To Exempt
The introduction of mandatory vaccinations turned public schools
in the United States “into theaters of conflict.” 122 Before Jacobson,
religious antivaccinationists garnered sympathy from courts. 123 After
Jacobson and Smith, most cases in which parents have litigated to
seek exemptions have not succeeded. This is not to say that parents
have not received religious exemptions from compulsory school
vaccination laws for their children. In fact, the statutes allowing
exemptions vary, with some states requiring only a statement of
opposition from the student, parent, or guardian. 124 An assessment of
cases involving exemptions from compulsory vaccinations shows
differing treatments by lower courts.
A.

Avoiding the Constitutional Question: Exceeding Statutory Authority

Some courts have avoided answering the critical question of
whether prohibiting a parent from obtaining exemptions from
compulsory vaccination laws is unconstitutional by instead analyzing
the scope of statutory authority. In other words, these courts looked
at whether an official or a department had the authority to deny an
exemption based on the language of the relevant statute. Thus, the
court could reach a decision on whether rejecting the exemption was
proper based entirely on statutory interpretation.
In In re LePage, a mother sought judicial review of the Wyoming
Department of Health’s denial of her request for a religious exemption
from a school immunization requirement, the hepatitis B vaccine
(HBV), for her daughter. 125 The issue was whether the Wyoming
statute 126 required that an exemption from immunization be granted if
there was a written religious objection or allowed the Department of
Health to inquire into the sincerity of the petitioner’s religious
beliefs. 127 The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the Department of
Health “exceeded its statutory authority” by inquiring into the
sincerity of the mother’s religious beliefs because the statute used

122. Willrich, supra note 14, at 230.
123. E.g., Matthews v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 86 N.W. 1036 (Mich. 1901);
State v. Hay, 35 S.E. 459 (N.C. 1900); Morris v. Columbus, 30 S.E. 850
(Ga. 1898); Potts v. Breen, 47 N.E. 81 (1897).
124. Leblanc, supra note 5.
125. In re LePage, 18 P.3d 1177, 1178–79 (Wyo. 2001).
126. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-309 (West 2011).
127. 18 P.3d at 1178.
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mandatory language. Therefore, the exemption was “self-executing
upon submission of a written objection.” 128
Similarly, in Department of Health v. Curry, the First District of
the District Court of Appeals of Florida concluded that the state
Department of Health exceeded its statutory authority, because the
Florida statute129 affords greater protection for “a parent’s fundamental
right to raise his or her child according to the religious tenets that he or
she chooses” by “prohibiting any inquiry by the Department into the
bona fides of the parent’s or guardian’s objection.” 130 Thus, courts have
used statutory construction and allocation of statutory authority to
allow exemptions from compulsory school vaccination laws. 131
B.

Facing the Question: The Constitutional Free Exercise Right Exists

Courts addressing the constitutional questions have imposed a
“present danger” standard and have impliedly supported the idea of a
constitutional right to exemption. 132 In Brown v. City School District
of Corning, 133 the trial court ruled that parents were entitled to the
exemption specified in the New York statute, which stated that the
mandatory vaccination law would not apply to “children whose
[parents or guardians held] genuine and sincere religious beliefs
[contrary to the mandate].” 134 The court found that the parents possessed religious beliefs that were “actively practiced in [their] home,”
which satisfied the court that the parents’ religious beliefs were
sincere. 135 Since the court additionally concluded that there was no
“clear and present danger” of a particular communicable disease, the
parents’ application for a preliminarily injunction enjoining the school
district from preventing their child from attending school was
granted. 136 Other New York cases have followed this precedent. 137

128. Id. at 1180–81.
129. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.032(3) (repealed 2003).
130. Dep’t of Health v. Curry, 722 So. 2d 874, 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
131. See Jones v. Wyo. Dep’t of Health, 18 P.3d 1189, 1193, 1195 (Wyo.
2001) (holding that the Hepatitis B vaccination was optional and, in
any event, the Health Department did not have statutory authority to
require that a reason be given for a medical exemption to
immunizations).
132. Willrich, supra note 14, at 314.
133. Brown v. City Sch. Dist. of Corning, 429 N.Y.S. 2d. 355 (Sup. Ct.
1980).
134. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164(9) (McKinney 2012).
135. 429 N.Y.S. 2d. at 357.
136. Id.
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A New York Family Court in In re Christine M. distinguished
Brown. 138 The court held that a father’s refusal to vaccinate his fouryear-old daughter for measles was medical neglect because there was
an enduring community measles epidemic. 139 This conclusion followed
because, even though the father was a Church of God Seventh Day
member and had “sincerely held” beliefs that were the foundation of
his religious exemption claim, his convictions had “medical and
scientific concerns” and his Church did not forbid vaccinations. 140
Interestingly, the court refused to mandate that the father vaccinate
his child because, by the time the court’s decision was made, the
measles epidemic had subsided. 141 Brown and In Re Christine M. can
be construed as implying that a constitutional right to religious
exemption exists, even though the free exercise right is dramatically
restricted in the face of public health interests to vaccinate.
C.

Facing the Question: The Constitutional Free Exercise Right Does
Not Exist

Despite the holdings of cases like Brown, in 2010, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Caviezel
v. Great Neck Public Schools held that there was no constitutional
right to religious exemption from mandatory vaccination laws. 142 The
parents of a four-year-old claimed that they were entitled to a
religious exemption from the New York public health law that allowed
exemptions for those parents or guardians who held “genuine and
sincere religious beliefs . . . contrary to the practices herein
required.” 143 The court came to this conclusion by applying the
137. See, e.g., In re Moses v. Bayport Bluepoint Union Free Sch. Dist., No.
05 CV 3808(DRH)(ARL), 2007 WL 526610, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13,
2007) (denying a school district’s motion for summary judgment on the
basis that a jury could find that the parents had a sincere religious
belief against mandatory vaccinations—implicitly supporting the idea of
a right to religious exemptions); Bowden v. Iona Grammar Sch., 726
N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (App. Div. 2001) (upholding preliminary injunction
enjoining school from requiring student to be vaccinated, in part
because “the religious exemption set forth in Public Health Law
§ 2164(9) is applicable to a private or parochial school” and because
“plaintiffs may assert a cause of action to enforce their right to a
religious exemption under the statute” (citing Brown, 429 N.Y.S.2d
355)).
138. In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 616 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992).
139. Id. at 613.
140. Id. at 614–18.
141. Id. at 618.
142. Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Sch., 739 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (E.D.N.Y.
2010).
143. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164(9) (McKinney 2012).
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Supreme Court’s public health and free exercise jurisprudence and by
citing other district court cases that concluded society’s interest in
preventing the spread of disease trumped the right to free exercise. 144
In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held in Workman v. Mingo County Board of Education 145 that
a mother was not entitled to exemption from the West Virginia law 146
requiring her daughter to be vaccinated before entrance into school.
The plaintiff asserted that her case qualified for the hybrid-rights
exception because her claim was one regarding “education-related
laws that burden religion.” 147 The court stated that, even though
there was some disagreement about what level of scrutiny should
apply and about the applicability of the hybrid-rights exception, this
case was not one in which the hybrid-rights question needed to be
addressed. 148
Applying strict scrutiny, the Workman court held that West
Virginia had a compelling interest in requiring children to be
vaccinated before they were allowed to attend school; thus, even if
this was a hybrid-rights case, the state would still prevail because the
public health law satisfied strict scrutiny. 149 Like in Caviezel, the
court also came to this decision primarily by broadly applying the
Supreme Court’s holding in Jacobson and the dicta in Prince. 150
Other courts have similarly deferred to the Court’s dicta with little
additional analysis in holding that the government prevails against
parental claims for religious exemptions. 151
D.

A New Law-Medicine Perspective: The Free Exercise Right Can Exist

One court has engaged in analysis that other courts should use,
even though the court’s conclusion is open to question. In Boone v.
144. Caviezel, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 284–85 (citing Workman v. Mingo Cnty.
Sch., 667 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); Boone v. Boozman,
217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 953 (E.D. Ark. 2002); McCarthy v. Boozman, 212
F. Supp. 2d 945, 949–50 (W.D. Ark. 2002).
145. Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348 (4th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 590 (2011).
146. W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-3-4 (LexisNexis 2012).
147. Workman, 419 F. App’x at 353.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 353–54.
150. Id. at 353.
151. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 65 S.E.2d 848, 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951)
(relying on Jacobson and holding that such statutes fall within
legislative power); Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 222–23 (Miss. 1979)
(applying Jacobson, Zucht, and Prince broadly and when mandatory
school vaccination requirements “conflict[ed] with the religious beliefs of
a parent,” even if the parent’s beliefs were sincere).
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Boozman, a mother attempted to distinguish her claim—that her
daughter was not required to be vaccinated against hepatitis B
(HBV)—from that of Jacobson because there was no presently
declared health emergency. 152 The District Court ruled that Jacobson
was not limited to those diseases presenting a “clear and present
danger” of spreading disease to society. 153 This court, unlike many
others, discussed the nature, communicability, and consequences of
the disease at issue. Although conceding that hepatitis B’s communicability was different from that of smallpox because hepatitis B does
not spread airborne as smallpox does, the court nevertheless described
hepatitis B as a “dangerous” disease because of its consequences,
citing the viral infection as the second leading cause of cancer. 154 The
court held that the statute, which allowed objections based only on
recognized religions, violated the mother’s free exercise rights when
she based her refusal on a religious “belief.” 155 The court concluded
that there was no compelling interest in preferring some religious sects
and individuals over others, but the rest of the statute, which required
immunization without a religious exemption, was constitutional. 156
The tipping point for the Boozman court was that, because the
groups at highest risk for the STI hepatitis B (presumably young
adults) would not likely “self-identify and pursue the vaccine,”
immunizing “school children against Hepatitis B has a real and
substantial relation to the protection of the public health and the
public safety.” 157 Thus, this court conducted an analysis that took
into consideration the specific factors of particular vaccinations. This
mode of analysis differs from the cases that used Jacobson and Zucht
as blanket statements and from the decisions that quoted Supreme
Court dicta to support that broad Jacobson and Zucht deference.
Post-Smith, courts have had different evaluations for when to
allow religious exemptions and what the inquiry would look like, even
when deciding that such exclusions would be allowed.

152. Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 947.
156. Id. at 954.
157. Id.
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IV. To Exempt: Arguing for a Limited Right to
Religious Exemption
With newly created vaccinations in the pipeline, including some
that do not target communicable diseases in an epidemic context, 158
the list of mandatory vaccinations will get longer, and the issue
of exemptions to the mandates will also grow. There are four
possible approaches in determining the scope of religious exemptions:
(1) overrule Jacobson and implement a new framework replacing
Jacobson; (2) uphold and update Jacobson, requiring mandatory
vaccinations with full religious exemption rights; (3) uphold and update
Jacobson, requiring mandatory vaccinations and expressly declaring
that religious exemptions should be withdrawn; or (4) uphold and
update Jacobson, requiring vaccinations but only allowing religious
exemptions from certain categories of compulsory vaccinations. This
Part will reject the “overrule Jacobson” approach, the “full exemption”
approach, and the “no exemption” approach. The conclusion is that the
“limited exemption” approach will yield the best balance between
individual civil liberties and the states’ police powers.
A.

Rejecting “Overrule Jacobson” and Accepting “Update Jacobson”

In addressing the Supreme Court’s public health jurisprudence,
there has been discussion about the applicability of Jacobson to
today’s society. 159 There is validity to the argument that the current
public health precedent does not directly apply to vaccinations in the
STI context. But with over a century of history and reliance on
Jacobson and its progeny in the lower courts, it seems unlikely that
Jacobson will be overruled and replaced by new framework. Thus, the
following analysis focuses on why Jacobson does not precisely fit
today’s circumstances and should be updated.
When Jacobson was decided, Cambridge, Massachusetts, was
undergoing a smallpox epidemic. 160 The nature and communicability
of smallpox and STIs, for example, are quite different. Smallpox was a
highly contagious disease and spread from casual contact. 161 STIs are
not casually communicable diseases, requiring a certain situation for
spread and infection to occur. The language that Jacobson used to
describe the necessity for liberty to be conditional under times of

158. G. Pascal Zachary, Vaccines and Their Promise Are Roaring Back,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2007, at B3.
159. E.g., Note, Toward a Twenty-First-Century: Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
121 Harv. L. Rev. 1820 (2008).
160. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905).
161. Willrich, supra note 14, at 22.
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great pressure has an underlying tone of urgency, similar to that of a
public emergency. 162
Some medical professionals and public health advocates would
analogize the situation at Cambridge in Jacobson to today’s
predicament, as our nation is currently undergoing a quiet yet
powerful epidemic with STIs such as HPV infection. 163 However, the
medical gap in danger and necessity between smallpox and STIs is
still quite distinct. States have recognized the danger of infections
that are not casually communicable, and legislation has incorporated
vaccines addressing those types of infections. 164 But the key question
involves deciding what kind of factors implicate the “public necessity”
urgency that Justice Harlan emphasized in Jacobson. 165 This Note
claims that “public necessity” does not apply to all mandatory
vaccination requirements but rather that the medical distinctions
between the diseases, predicated on science and logic, should be
incorporated into the legal framework. 166
Currently, mandatory vaccination cases have been immensely
deferential to Jacobson, applying it broadly and expanding the scope
of governmental power—including using Jacobson to justify
compulsory sterilization. 167 But the scope of today’s compulsory
vaccination laws far exceeds what the Court could have imagined in
the early 1900s. The Court’s decisions were based on diseases such as

162. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.
163. Richard A. Watson, Human Papillomavirus: Confronting the
Epidemic—A Urologist’s Perspective, 7 Revs. In Urology 135, 138–40
(2005).
164. See Karen R. Broder et al., Preventing Tetanus, Diphtheria, and
Pertussis Among Adolescents: Use of Tetanus Toxoid, Reduced
Diphtheria Toxoid and Acellular Pertussis Vaccines, Morbidity &
Mortality Wkly. Rep., Mar. 24, 2006, at 1, 7 (discussing the tetanus
vaccine, which is a required immunization for children entering school,
as a serious bacterial infection that is not a communicable disease); see
also Eric E. Mast et al., A Comprehensive Immunization Strategy to
Eliminate Transmission of Hepatitis B Virus Infection in the United
States, Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep., Dec. 8, 2006, at 1
(describing the hepatitis B vaccine (HBV) and its targets of infection,
which cannot be infected by casual contact).
165. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.
166. See infra Part V.
167. Justice Holmes infamously relied on Jacobson to hold that “[t]he
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
cutting the Fallopian tubes . . . . Three generations of imbeciles are
enough.” Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding a state statute
providing for the sterilization of those committed to mental
institutions); see Willrich, supra note 14, at 334.
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smallpox and measles and their sweeping effects. 168 At that time,
knowledge about and technology targeting STIs were not available.
Therefore, Jacobson, while significant and relevant, should not be
considered a blanket rule applied to all current compulsory
vaccination laws, as we have many mandates that were not
implemented or even imaginable at that time.
But as one of the few Supreme Court precedents on public health
and compulsory vaccination laws available, Jacobson is relevant to
mandatory vaccination decisions in the STI context. One way to
differentiate Jacobson from current developments in vaccine
technology is that vaccines in the STI context, such as HPV vaccines,
fall predominantly in the category of “self-protection” laws. “Selfprotection” describes the idea that one is doing something to protect
one’s own interest or for one’s own protection. 169 However, the
underlying rationale of public health is “protection of society” and
“for others,” or “protection of the public.” 170 Thus, the HPV vaccine,
for example, is distinguishable from the public health rationale and
Jacobson’s underlying “protection of society” and “for others”
justification, expressly referred to in Justice Harlan’s necessity
language, 171 because HPV needs intimate contact in order for the
virus to be spread. Conversely, smallpox was spread easily through
casual contact. 172 Thus, individuals who receive the HPV vaccine
primarily use it to prevent the STI, and because HPV has such a
tight association with cancers, especially cervical cancer, many view
the HPV vaccine as also protecting themselves against cancer. 173
168. See id. at 28, 32 (describing the terrifying and violent symptoms,
mortality, and the permanent existence of smallpox scars on survivors).
169. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 Am. J.L.
& Med. 461, 462 (1986) (providing a foundation for the idea of “selfprotection”).
170. Id. at 483, 485.
171. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) (“Smallpox being
prevalent and increasing at Cambridge, the court would usurp the
functions of another branch of government if it adjudged, as matter of
law, that the mode adopted under the sanction of the State, to protect
the people at large, was arbitrary and not justified by the necessities of
the case.”).
172. See Willrich, supra note 14, at 21 (describing the infectiousness of
smallpox); see also id. at 239 (explaining that one homeless man swept
Cleveland into a major smallpox outbreak).
173. See Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs): Genital HPV Infection-Fact
Sheet, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, http://
www.cdc.gov/std/hpv/stdfact-hpv.htm (last updated Aug. 9, 2012)
(providing information on the association between HPV and cancers);
see also Div. of STD Prevention, Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Prevention
of Genital HPV Infection and Sequelae: Report of an
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On the other hand, laws mandating HPV vaccine are also not
pure “self-protection” laws because even though getting the vaccine
means protecting oneself from infection, taking the vaccine also
reduces the rapid spread of the STI to others. Thus, although
Jacobson may not necessarily fit neatly within the context of
vaccination technology innovations, Jacobson is at least relevant to
mandatory vaccination decisions in the STI context, although perhaps
not directly instructive. The above analysis, however, supports the
contention that Jacobson should be updated.
B.

Rejecting the “Full Exemption” Approach

The “full exemption” approach—that is, allowing all exemptions—
would not be feasible because such a methodology would dismantle
the fundamental goal of mass vaccination programs. Mandatory
vaccination laws “employ[ ] the concept of herd protection, and hold[ ]
that only a limited, statistically determined proportion of a population needs to possess individual immunity to a particular disease in
order for the entire population to remain protected from the
disease.” 174 The idea is that vaccination laws apply to each person to
protect the greater community; once a certain threshold number of
people are vaccinated, then even if a small number of people are not
vaccinated, the larger community is still protected. 175 Thus, if all
religious exemptions from mandatory vaccinations were allowed, then
the basis for vaccination laws could be destroyed, and the community
would be left unprotected. On one hand, this result would occur only if
the number of religious exemptions were so high that it put the
community below the threshold and herd immunity is lost. 176 On the
other hand, the immense presence of and rise in popularity of antivaccination sentiments makes the second approach a dangerous choice.
C.

Rejecting the “No Exemption” Approach
and Keeping “Limited Exemption”

In addressing the free exercise question—whether there is a
constitutional right to religious exemptions from mandatory vaccination laws—most of the courts in compulsory vaccination cases have
broadly applied Jacobson and the Prince dicta to mean any
mandatory vaccination law satisfies the compelling governmental

External Consultants’ Meeting 6 (1999), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/std/hpv/HPVSupplement99.pdf (further information on
HPV’s relationship with cervical cancer).
174. Heller, supra note 32, at 11.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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interest test. 177 Thus, especially with Smith, it may be tempting to
conclude that no right to religious exemptions from compulsory
vaccination exists. Under that rationale, the “no exemption” approach
of upholding Jacobson and mandating vaccines without allowing for
religious exemptions seems appealing, especially with lower courts
coming to the decision that no constitutional right to exemption
exists. 178 On the contrary, this Note argues that the cases on
conscientious objection from the military draft provide a convincing
argument that there should be a statutory right to religious
exemptions from compulsory vaccination laws, even though there may
not be a constitutional right. 179 Thus, there are three compelling and
mutually reinforcing reasons why state legislatures should, and most
legislatures currently do, provide some form of religious exemptions
from compulsory vaccination laws. 180
From a historical and public policy standpoint, antivaccination
sentiments have been a strong force since vaccinations were invented
and forced upon others. The most adamant objections to vaccinations
came from parents who had lost their children due to complications
that they attributed to vaccines. One poignant example was Mrs.
Caswell of Cambridge, Massachusetts, who lost her five-year-old
daughter Annie to lockjaw during the smallpox outbreak that gave
rise to the law that was upheld in Jacobson. 181 The death certificate
listed tetanus as the cause of death, with vaccination as a
contributing cause. 182 Contrary to the idea that those who protest
mandatory vaccinations are just cranks and extremists, many citizens
who object to compulsory vaccination laws are everyday American
parents seeking what is best for their child. 183 Some may have strong

177. The Prince Court held that the parent’s free exercise rights under the
First Amendment were not violated, stating that “he cannot claim
freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself
on religious grounds.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944). The Court supported this analogy to compulsory vaccination by
saying, “The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to
expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter
to ill health or death.” Id. at 166–67.
178. Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Schs., 739 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (E.D.N.Y.
2010).
179. See Salmon & Siegel, supra note 11, at 289 (building on the idea of
analogizing conscientious objection from conscription with exemption
from compulsory vaccination laws).
180. See supra note 119.
181. Willrich, supra note 14, at 279.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
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religious or philosophical beliefs. 184 Some may just have fears. 185 There
may be differences in opinion as to what is for the best; however, with
the increasing frequency of individuals seeking exemption, legislatures
have not repealed their religious exemption clauses in their mandatory
vaccination statutes. This reflects the fact that the American constituency wants to keep the exemptions and preserve their civil liberties.
One example is the practical outcome of Boone v. Boozman. 186
The initial legal outcome of Boozman was that Arkansas’s compulsory
vaccination laws no longer contained religious or philosophical
exemptions. 187 But removing the exemptions proved so unpopular that
the provision was rewritten. 188 Today the law allows any parent to
receive a religious or philosophical exemption. 189 Additionally, the fact
that almost all states have religious exemptions and almost half have
philosophical exemptions means that eliminating exemptions
altogether would be immensely unpopular. 190 Thus, from a historical
and political perspective, some form of religious exemption should be
allowed.
Additionally, the Prince dicta and courts that broadly hold that
individuals should not have the right to practice their religion at the
expense of exposing the community and children to communicable
diseases must be put into context. 191 The communicable diseases,
illnesses, and deaths that the Court envisioned in Jacobson and
Prince were the terrifying images of smallpox and the mass deaths
that occurred when the epidemic hit the United States in the early
1900s. 192 Although STIs are an important public health challenge,
their consequences are not the same as smallpox and diseases that fall
184. See Grady, supra note 1 (describing a mother’s discomfort with the
HPV vaccine because of its implications on her and her family’s religious
ideology and practices).
185. See Leblanc, supra note 5 (describing a worried mother willing to go far
to protect her child from what she views as the dangers of vaccination).
186. 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
187. See Note, supra note 159, at 1831.
188. Ark. Code. Ann. § 6-18-702(d)(4)(A) (2007); see also M. Craig Smith,
Note, A Bad Reaction: A Look at the Arkansas General Assembly’s
Response to McCarthy v. Boozman and Boone v. Boozman, 58 Ark. L.
Rev. 251, 257–58 (2005).
189. Ark. Code. Ann. § 6-18-702(d)(4)(A); see also Smith, supra note 188,
at 258.
190. For states that have religious exemption clauses to their mandatory
school vaccination statutes, see supra note 119. For states that have
philosophical exemption clauses to their mandatory school vaccination
laws, see supra note 121.
191. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944).
192. Id.
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in the same category as smallpox. Thus, a right to religious exemption
may not exist for diseases like smallpox, but such a right could exist
for vaccinations against diseases like STIs.
To support the idea that there should be a right to obtain exemption from certain types of vaccinations, the military draft cases,
including Hamilton, Seeger, Welsh, and Gillette, can be used as an
analogy. 193 The Court in Hamilton concluded that conscientious
objector status was a privilege that came “from the acts of
Congress.” 194 These military conscientious objection cases support the
idea that each state’s legislature should exercise discretion to provide
religious exemptions to those who are genuine and sincere in their
objections to legally mandated vaccinations. By including specific
conditions for conscientious objections, which include (1) showing
opposition to war, (2) because of religious beliefs, (3) that are sincere,
this system creates a balance for preserving individual free exercise
freedoms and serving the public interest. 195 Holders of nontheistic
views and philosophical convictions were included in the definition of
religion, as the Supreme Court allowed a broad scope for the
definition of religion in these conscientious objection cases. 196 Having a
similar specific system with narrower conditions to provide
exemptions for those religiously opposed to vaccinations would
analogously create a balance of individual free exercise rights and the
public health interest. Thus, the inference from these draft cases is
that legislatures authorized to pass laws of compulsion, including
state and local authorities in mandatory vaccination cases, have the
discretion to allow religious exemptions, and the legislatures should
allow exemptions in certain specific situations.
Lastly, Yoder, which Smith specifically did not overrule and
instead sought to distinguish, implies that the Free Exercise Clause is
not dead. 197 There are two alternative routes to Smith’s rational basis
review: the hybrid-rights and Hialeah exceptions. Thus, current
Supreme Court jurisprudence also does not seem to support eliminating
religious exemptions altogether. From this analysis, the “limited
exemption” approach has strong historical, political, and legal
support; thus, this final approach should be the basis on which the
legal framework is built.

193. See Salmon & Siegel, supra note 11, at 289 (using conscientious
objection from conscription as a model).
194. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934).
195. Salmon & Siegel, supra note 11, at 289.
196. Id. at 293.
197. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 205 (1972).
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V. A Compromise: Implementing a Novel Legal Framework
The above discussion explains how the “limited exemption”
approach will yield the best balance between individual civil liberties
and the states’ police powers. This approach involves upholding
Jacobson and requiring vaccinations, but allowing religious
exemptions from certain categories of compulsory vaccinations, which
strikes a balance between maximizing individual civil liberties and
allowing for a significant scope to state police powers. The analysis
performed to reach this approach shows that Jacobson needs to be
updated. One commentator has advocated this path and articulated a
sound start for how to update Jacobson into a dual classification for
necessity. 198 But there are some fundamental aspects to the dual
system that need to be altered to create a working legal framework.
This Note argues for a three-tiered analysis to generate a novel
legal framework for keeping religious exemptions in a subset of
circumstances. The three tiers of analysis include (1) starting with a
law-medicine perspective to separate the vaccines into two categories,
(2) applying a constitutional analysis by explaining why the hybridrights exception should and can be used, and (3) advocating for
certain policy considerations to fill the gaps.
A.

Law-Medicine Analysis: Tweaking the Dual System

First, the dual path laid out by one commentator involves
classifying vaccines into two categories, derived from the Jacobson
necessity language. 199 The two categories are medically necessary and
practically necessary vaccines. 200 “Medically necessary” vaccines are
“the only known viable defenses against diseases taking hold in a
community.” 201 “Practically necessary” vaccines, on the other hand,
are not the only possibility for addressing the disease, but the
“alternatives are, in practice, not used by a significant number of
people.” 202 This categorization is too broad because there can always
be other defenses and alternatives that are not widely used. This Note
argues for incorporating a medical methodology along with the legal
analysis to separate vaccines into these two original groups: medically
and practically necessary vaccines.
The commentator points out, citing the smallpox vaccine in
Jacobson as an example of a medically necessary vaccine, that “there
was no other less coercive means available to [stamp out] the
198. Note, supra note 159, at 1834.
199. Id. at 1820.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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outbreak.” 203 But as an example of other means, public health official
Friedrich was able to temporarily rid the city of Cleveland of
smallpox through isolation and rigorous and systematic disinfection of
houses. 204 Thus, there were other means—whether they were less
coercive or not is debatable. The commentator also contrasts smallpox
with HPV, citing the HPV vaccine as an example of a practically
necessary one because there are easier alternative methods to
protecting oneself, such as “sexual knowledge, disease screening, safe
sex, and abstinence.” 205 While stating that the line between medically
and practically necessary vaccines will not always be clear, the
commentator starts the analysis by generally delineating two
categories. 206 But to actually apply the analysis, a law-medicine
perspective must be used.
The rapid output of new medical information shows a strong link
between HPV and various cancers and diseases. 207 Currently, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) statistics show
that each year, about 12,000 women get cervical cancer in the United
States, and almost all of these cancers are HPV associated. 208
Interpreting the “almost all” language in the CDC’s statement, this
means that HPV almost satisfies the condition of necessity because
almost every person who has cervical cancer has HPV infection. 209
But just because those who have cervical cancer also have or have
had HPV infection is not persuasive enough to satisfy the urgency
that the Jacobson necessity standard implies: sufficiency is also
important. HPV infection does not satisfy the sufficiency condition
because not everyone who has HPV gets cervical cancer, and in fact a
significant majority of women who are infected with HPV do not get
cancer. 210 Thus, the distinction between smallpox and HPV, and what
fits the necessity standard of Jacobson, is not whether there are
203. Id.
204. Willrich, supra note 14, at 239.
205. Note, supra note 159, at 1820.
206. Id.
207. See Div. of STD Prevention, supra note 173 (“High-risk types of
HPV are found in ≥ 93% of cervical cancers worldwide . . . [and t]his
body of epidemiologic and laboratory data is sufficiently strong that the
International Agency for Research on Cancer and the National
Institutes of Health have concluded that high-risk genital HPV types act
as carcinogens in the development of cervical cancer.”).
208. Sexually Transmitted Diseases, supra note 173.
209. See Div. Of STD Prevention, supra note 173, at 6 (“[I]nfection with
high-risk types appears to be ‘necessary’ for the development of cervical
cancer”).
210. Id.
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alternative remedies for preventing the disease but rather the nature
of the disease itself.
For example, infection with the variola virus was necessary for the
development of smallpox because all those with smallpox were
infected with the variola virus. 211 Additionally, those infected by the
variola virus would inevitably get smallpox. 212 Therefore, infection by
the variola virus was sufficient to get smallpox. Under this analysis of
the nature of the disease alone, the danger surrounding smallpox
infection and the necessity for the smallpox vaccine was much higher
than for an HPV vaccine. The danger and necessity surrounding
smallpox gave rise to Jacobson, and applying the Jacobson holding
broadly to all successful vaccines would be inappropriate.
Instead of deeming vaccinations to be medically necessary because
there are no other alternatives, and practically necessary because
there are alternatives, the approach should be to emulate the type of
analysis followed in Boone: evaluate the nature, communicability, and
consequences of the disease that a vaccine would target. 213 The
necessity analysis regarding the nature of the disease shows that the
underlying rationale of Jacobson, which was targeted at infections like
smallpox, does not fit infections like HPV. 214 Infections like HPV are
communicable in noncasual settings and result in consequences less
severe and immediate compared to infections like smallpox. Since
infections like HPV do not pose the same danger as smallpox, the
necessity for compulsory vaccination is not nearly as great as in
Jacobson.
Although the Boone court’s analysis was novel in that it targeted
the nature, communicability, and consequence of the disease hepatitis
B, the analysis faltered and ultimately failed because the law-medicine
approach was not complete. Firstly, the Boone court came to the
broad conclusion that, because high-risk groups would not likely “selfidentify and pursue the [HBV] vaccine,” immunizing would have a
larger impact on public health and safety. 215 This does not fit the
standard that was set forth in Jacobson. Justice Harlan articulated in
Jacobson that “[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount
211. See Willrich, supra note 14, at 21–23 (describing indirectly the
infectiousness and causation between the variola virus and smallpox).
212. Id. at 23.
213. See Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002)
(addressing these aspects in regard to hepatitis B and providing a more
in depth law-medicine analysis than other courts have).
214. Although the Supreme Court did not specifically analyze the necessity
and sufficiency issue in Jacobson, the broad necessity standard that
Justice Harlan articulated in his majority opinion emulates the logic
behind the necessity and sufficiency analysis undertaken in Part V.A.
215. Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
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necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an
epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” 216 The
Boone court stated that the Jacobson decision was not limited to
those diseases presenting only a “clear and present danger.” 217 But
Justice Harlan used the words “paramount necessity,” “self-defense,”
“epidemic,” and “threatens,” which all indicate danger and urgency.
This seems to support the “clear and present danger” idea used in
Brown and Christine M., which were distinguished from each other
but both held to this standard. 218
Secondly, the Boone court discussed communicability of the
disease briefly, stating that “Hepatitis B is spread by bodily fluids”
and has a robust survival rate on surfaces, but the court did not carry
the medical analysis further. 219 Spreading through bodily fluids means
that hepatitis B can spread through contact with blood, semen, and
vaginal fluids. 220 Thus, infection spreads through sexual contact with
a person infected by HBV or shared needles. “[The] Hepatitis B . . .
virus[ ] cannot be spread by casual contact, such as holding hands,
sharing eating utensils or drinking glasses, breast-feeding, kissing,
hugging, coughing or sneezing.” 221 The nature and communicability of
hepatitis B in comparison with a disease like smallpox is
distinguishable, and while the Boone court referred to the distinction,
the court did not seem to embrace the full depth of the medical
dissimilarity. 222
The court discussed the consequences of HBV, stating that the
virus can lead to “sclerosis, scarring . . . of the liver, or liver cancer
216. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). Justice Harlan
used “necessity” twice more in his opinion in Jacobson, further
highlighting the necessity standard that was set forth in this decision.
See id. at 28, 30.
217. Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
218. Compare Brown v. City Sch. Dist. of Corning, 429 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357
(Sup. Ct. 1980) (“[T]he Court must be satisfied . . . that there is no
present circumstance which, in the opinion of the public health
authorities, represents a clear and present danger of the particular
communicable disease.”), with In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 618
(Fam. Ct. 1992) (declining to order inoculation because there was no
“urgency” due to an epidemic or outbreak).
219. Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
220. Hepatitis B, MedlinePlus, U.S. Nat’l Libr. Med., http://www.nlm.nih.
gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000279.htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2012).
221. Hepatitis: Prevention, N.Y. Times Health Guide, http://health.
nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/hepatitis/prevention.html (updated
Sep. 29, 2010).
222. Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (“Even if such a distinction could be
made [between smallpox and hepatitis B], the Court cannot say that
Hepatitis B presents no such clear and present danger.”).
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after chronic infection,” 223 but the court did not analyze how this
result leads to a similar situation of urgent necessity as a disease like
smallpox. In a very general sense, HBV is fatal in about 1% of
cases, 224 whereas “death may occur in up to 30% of [smallpox]
cases.” 225 But HBV and smallpox each have variances from their
general and most common forms. A type of HBV characterized as
acute HBV is fatal in approximately 0.5% to 1% of cases, and fatality
results in about 15% of those infected with what is called chronic
HBV infection (long-term infection cases) after childhood. 226 The most
common form of smallpox variola major had an overall fatality rate of
about 30%. 227 Flat and hemorrhagic smallpox, two types of variola
major, were usually fatal, while variola minor (“a less common
presentation of smallpox”), had death rates of 1% or less. 228 This level
of insight into smallpox was not present in 1905 when Jacobson was
decided.
This deeper understanding shows that there is a gray area in
distinguishing the danger of HBV and smallpox when analyzing only
the consequences of viral infection. Thus, the factors that Boone
initially started to analyze, which include the nature, communicability,
and consequences of the disease, should be analyzed completely in
deciding whether a vaccine should fall into the category of medically
necessary or practically necessary. 229 To be able to analogize and
distinguish which vaccines should fall under medically necessary and
which should fall under practically necessary, the viral infection
should, like smallpox, be easily communicable and have severe
consequences. 230 Furthermore, the target of the vaccine should be
both necessary to develop into its targeted preventable disease and
sufficient to do so in accordance with Jacobson’s necessity
223. Id.
224. MedlinePlus, supra note 220.
225. Emergency Preparedness and Response: Questions and Answers About
Smallpox Disease, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention,
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/faq/smallpox_disease.asp (last
updated Mar. 13, 2009).
226. See Hepatitis B Information for Health Professionals: Hepatitis B FAQs for
Health Professionals, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention,
http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/hbv/hbvfaq.htm (updated Jan. 31, 2012).
227

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Smallpox Fact Sheet, Ctrs.
for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp (last updated Dec. 30, 2004).

228. Id.
229. See Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
230. See Gostin, supra note 169, at 483 (arguing that a reasonably high
standard of public harm should be required before public health
intervention).
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standard. 231 This logical construction is what the medical community
relies on, and the legal community should do the same in evaluating
medical decisions. 232
An influential public health scholar, Lawrence Gostin, has argued
that making inoculations like the HPV vaccine mandatory contributes
to the concerns of parents about the safety of school-based
vaccinations and may have negative consequences, like “heighten[ed]
parental and public apprehensions.” 233 Additionally, Gostin has stated
that the major underlying basis for public health law is to prevent
harm to the public and thus the threshold for public health
intervention should be reasonably high. 234 Thus, Gostin and his camp
would likely approve of having two categories of mandatory
vaccinations—medically necessary vaccines and practically necessary
vaccines—because separating the two types of vaccines using the
Jacobson necessity standard more adequately aligns with the
underlying public health rationale, and having fewer vaccinations on
the mandatory list may decrease that public anxiety. 235
B.

Constitutional Analysis: Incorporating the Hybrid-Rights Exception
into the Dual System

Once a law-medicine analysis is employed and the vaccines
mandated are categorized as medically necessary or practically
necessary, the next step is to evaluate the two categorizations of
vaccines. If the vaccination mandate did not provide for exemptions,
the claim for religious exemption would be based on the Free Exercise
Clause. 236 The two major considerations for successfully bringing a
231. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) (containing
necessity language by Justice Harlan).
232. See Div. of STD Prevention, supra note 173, at 6 (using necessity
and sufficiency language in medical analysis).
233. Lawrence O. Gostin & Catherine D. DeAngelis, Editorial, Mandatory
HPV Vaccination: Public Health vs Private Wealth, 297 JAMA 1921,
1922 (2007).
234. See Gostin, supra note 169, at 483 (“[T]he seriousness and probability of
[harm to the public] should be the primary parameter for decisionmaking. The absence of any intention to serve the interests of the
individual suggests that the threshold for public health action should be
a reasonably high probability of serious harm to the public.”).
235. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28 (“We say necessities of the case, because it
might be that an acknowledged power of a local community to protect
itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all, might be
exercised in particular circumstances . . . in such an arbitrary,
unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably
required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the
courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.”).
236. See U.S. Const. amend. I.
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claim would be (1) scrutiny level and (2) the type of successful claim
that can be brought.
1.

Scrutiny Level: How to Get Around Smith

A successful claim for religious exemption from mandatory school
vaccination laws would have to be a hybrid-rights claim because the
compulsory school vaccination laws are neutral laws of general
applicability under Smith. 237 If the claim were evaluated under Smith,
the scrutiny level would be rational basis review, and the claim would
not likely survive because most courts have stated that vaccination
laws satisfy rational basis. Thus, the claim needs to be one of the
other alternative routes so as to implicate a higher level of scrutiny.
Those alternative routes are claims falling under Hialeah and the
hybrid-rights exception. But vaccination laws are not discriminatory
laws of the sort invalidated in Hialeah. 238 Thus, the only alternative is
the hybrid-rights claim.
In the case of compulsory vaccination, the court should no longer
apply the Smith rational basis test in the face of a hybrid-rights claim
but rather should apply a higher standard—strict scrutiny. 239 While a
law of general and neutral applicability is presumptively valid, when a
hybrid-rights case is sufficiently similar to Yoder, the validity of the
general and neutrally applicable law is questioned. 240 Smith also
explains that the Sherbert test was created in a context that “lent
itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the
relevant conduct.” 241 Like the unemployment compensation programs
in Sherbert, this vaccination system creates a mechanism for
individualized exemptions. 242 Thus, analogous to Sherbert, whether
the State can infringe upon an individual’s free exercise right should
be evaluated under a compelling governmental interest test—the
strict scrutiny standard. Assuming that a successful hybrid-rights
237. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (discussing laws that
are neutral and of general applicability).
238. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 534–35 (1993) (holding that the Hialeah ordinance was
unconstitutional because the statute discriminated against those who
practice Santeria).
239. See Hope Lu, Comment, Addressing the Hybrid Rights Exception: How
the Colorable-Plus Approach Can Revive the Free Exercise Clause, 63
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 257, 279–80 (2012) (using the language of Smith
to explain why strict scrutiny is logically the appropriate level of review
for hybrid-rights claims).
240. Id. at 280.
241. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
242. See supra Part V.A (discussing medically necessary and practically
necessary vaccines).
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claim triggers strict scrutiny, the next inquiry would be how to bring
a successful hybrid-rights case.
2.

Successfully Bringing a Hybrid-Rights Claim

Since both medically and practically necessary vaccinations would
be mandated, the next threshold inquiry would be whether the
hybrid-rights exception is a viable option. Although there has been
significant controversy in the lower courts over what the Supreme
Court truly meant by “hybrid” cases, there are three major
approaches to the hybrid-rights exception that have been recognized:
(1) the “refusal-to-recognize” approach, (2) the “independently viable”
theory, and (3) the “colorable-claim” approach. 243
After evaluating each approach for its likelihood of success as the
basis of a hybrid-rights claim, the two approaches that may succeed
in a claim for religious exemption from mandatory school vaccination
laws are the independently viable claim and the colorable-claim
approaches. For parents seeking to bring a hybrid-rights claim, which
would likely be a free exercise claim coupled with the parents’
fundamental right to raise their child, bringing such a claim in a court
that recognizes the colorable-claim approach would likely be the most
successful.
a.

The Refusal-To-Recognize Approach

Some courts have refused to recognize the hybrid-rights claim,
unless the Supreme Court gives express confirmation of the
exception’s validity. 244 This is now described as the “refusal-torecognize” approach. 245 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit initially used this refusal-to-recognize approach in
243. See Lu, supra note 239, at 265–67; see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1262 (3d ed. 2006)
(‘‘Lower courts have done relatively little to clarify when a claim should
be regarded as ‘hybrid’ under Smith.’’). There are some minor
approaches that scholars have proposed as alternatives or solutions of
the “best approach” for addressing the hybrid-rights exception. See
Benjamin I. Siminou, Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Rights: An Analysis
of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s Approach to the Hybrid-Rights
Exception in Douglas County v. Anaya, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 311, 324
(2006) (describing another potential hybrid rights approach called the
genuine implication theory); Lu, supra note 239, at 269–72 (discussing
additional approaches that characterize some circuits’ decisions,
including the “open-recognition” approach). These approaches could also
be successful in bringing a hybrid-rights claim in the compulsory school
vaccination law context.
244. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993)
(rejecting the application of strict scrutiny, or in fact anything higher
than Smith’s rational basis review, to a hybrid-rights case); Leebaert v.
Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) (same).
245. Siminou, supra note 243, at 318.
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Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 246 where the court stated that the
hybrid-rights exception was “completely illogical” because the level of
scrutiny should not depend upon the number of constitutional rights
claimed. 247 The court held that a public university’s policy regarding
the school’s veterinary-medicine curriculum, which had a required
course involving operations on live animals, did not need to meet any
standard stricter than the standard in Smith. 248 Therefore, the court
applied rational basis review. 249 The Second Circuit 250 and the
Missouri Supreme Court 251 have also taken this view. 252
In a jurisdiction that follows the “refusal-to-recognize” approach,
a hybrid-rights claim seeking religious exemption from compulsory
school vaccination laws would fail because the court would not
recognize the hybrid-rights claim.
b.

The Independently Viable Claim Theory

The independently viable claim approach to the hybrid-rights
exception requires the free exercise right be conjoined with an
accompanying claim that is independently viable in order for strict
scrutiny to be triggered. 253 The courts that have been thought to take
this approach are the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit, although whether the
First Circuit followed the independent viability claim is debated. 254 In
EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 255 the D.C. Circuit held
246. Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 177.
247. Id. at 180.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 143–44 (agreeing with Kissinger that scrutiny
level should not be dictated by the number of constitutional claims
available to the plaintiff).
251. See, e.g., Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537, 547–48 (Mo. 2002) (en
banc) (agreeing with Kissinger and that case’s analysis).
252. See Lu, supra note 239, at 265–66, 273–74 (2012) (providing a more
detailed explanation and review of the “refusal-to-recognize” approach).
253. See John L. Tuttle, Note, Adding Color: An Argument for the Colorable
Showing Approach to Hybrid Rights Claims Under Employment Division
v. Smith, 3 Ave Maria L. Rev. 741, 754 (2005) (discussing the
approach taken by the First and D.C. Circuits).
254. See Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and Hybrid Religious
Exemptions, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1494, 1501 (2010) (“[T]he First Circuit
may now be best understood to apply a different approach . . . .”); see
also Lu, supra note 239, at 267, 269–70 (fleshing out the “independently
viable” approach and discussing why the First Circuit’s approach does
not fall under this view any more).
255. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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that a religious ministerial exception survived Smith, but if that was
an incorrect conclusion, the holding was still valid because the
plaintiff could use the hybrid-rights exception by joining her Free
Exercise Clause claim with her independently viable Establishment
Clause claim. 256
The independently viable claim may be successful if brought in a
court that recognizes this approach; however, this theory may not be
the most suitable approach because it is fundamentally and logically
flawed. If each claim can be brought independently, then the existence
of a hybrid-rights exception is not needed. 257 The plaintiff could just
bring each claim forward on its own. Additionally, it might be
difficult for a parent to argue an independently viable claim.
c.

The Colorable-Claim Standard

The last major approach is the colorable-claim standard. 258 In
order to qualify for a hybrid-rights exception, the colorable-claim
standard requires that a plaintiff with a free exercise claim join that
claim with a “colorable claim” that an accompanying constitutional
right has also been violated—“colorable” meaning that there is a
“likelihood . . . of success on the merits.” 259
The colorable-claim approach was formulated from a case decided
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Swanson
v. Guthrie Independent School District No. 1-L. 260 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that even though Smith was not particularly instructive
about the application of the hybrid-rights exception, for such a
hybrid-rights claim to be brought there had to be “at least [a]
require[d] colorable showing of infringement of recognized and specific
constitutional rights, rather than the mere invocation of a general
right.” 261 In other words, a colorable claim did not require a clear and
blatant violation of an accompanying constitutional right, but it did
require more than a general allegation. 262 But this court did not
256. Id. at 466–68.
257. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (stating that because
the independent free exercise claim succeeded, the Court did not have
reason to analyze the equal protection claim as well).
258. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 465
(N.Y. 2006) (rejecting the hybrid rights approach because the claim of
free speech in addition to the free exercise challenge was
“insubstantial”).
259. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n., 165 F.3d 692, 703, 707 (9th Cir.
1999), vacated, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
260. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-L, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
261. Id. at 700.
262. Id.
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actually apply the hybrid-rights exception because the plaintiffs did
not meet the showing of a colorable claim. 263 The colorable-claim
approach was then adopted by the Ninth Circuit, 264 which in a line of
cases affirmed the standard 265 and concluded that a colorable claim of
an accompanying constitutional violation served to hybridize the
companion claim with the plaintiffs’ free exercise action. 266
There are criticisms of the logic of the colorable-claim approach. 267
One criticism is that the approach of adding two failing claims to
create a winning claim is illogical. 268 But this perspective arises when
the free exercise claim and the additional constitutional claim are
viewed as completely separate claims. This criticism can be resolved
by shifting the viewpoint of the “colorable-claim” approach to the
“colorable-plus” approach. 269 The colorable-plus approach adopts the
rationale of the First Circuit’s 2008 decision in Parker v. Hurley,
which stated that each part of a hybrid-rights claim should be
reviewed interdependently rather than separately. 270 For example, a
parent’s claim regarding religious exemptions from compulsory school
vaccination laws would likely include a free exercise claim and a claim
concerning the parent’s fundamental right to raise her child. These
two claims, whether a parent’s right to exercise her religion freely and
raise her child under those religious beliefs has been violated, are “sets
of interests [that] inform one [an]other” and are interrelated. 271
263. See id. (“Based on the foregoing, we hold that Defendants were not
required to show a compelling state interest in this case, despite
Plaintiffs’ attempt to invoke the hybrid-rights doctrine.”).
264. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 704–05 (applying the colorable-claim test after
an in-depth analysis of the other available approaches and hybridizing
the case). Thomas was vacated en banc due to lack of ripeness. 220 F.3d
1134, 1137.
265. See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the
standard set out in Thomas).
266. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004) (also
affirming the Thomas standard and using the colorable-claim test
because it is a middle ground solution).
267. See Note, supra note 254, at 1505 (criticizing the colorable-claim
approach); see also Lu, supra note 239, at 276–77 (explaining criticisms
of the colorable-claim approach).
268. Note, supra note 254, at 1505.
269. See Lu, supra note 239, at 278–79 (introducing the idea of the
colorable-plus approach).
270. Id.; see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 98 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
Court did not analyze separately the due process and free exercise
interests of the parent-plaintiffs, but rather considered the two claims
interdependently . . . .”).
271. Parker, 514 F.3d at 98.
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Because these interests inform one another and are so intertwined, it
is logical and desirable to view these claims together to determine
whether cumulatively the claims are strong enough to serve as the
basis of a hybrid-rights claim. 272 Thus, the colorable-plus approach
views the free exercise claim and the additional colorable
constitutional claim in totality, rather than separately, to reach the
question of whether a hybrid rights claim is available.
The colorable-plus standard is fundamentally more desirable than
any other approach. This approach is stronger than the refusal-torecognize approach because the latter ignores the fact that the
Supreme Court developed the hybrid-rights idea in Smith. 273 The
colorable-plus approach is also stronger than the independently viable
claim approach because the former standard does not create the same
logical fallacy that the independently viable claim does and resolves
the criticism against the colorable-claim approach. Thus, assuming
that a compulsory vaccination case can be viewed as a hybrid-rights
case through the colorable-plus approach, the next inquiry is whether
strict scrutiny is satisfied.
3.

Strict Scrutiny: Medically Necessary, Not Practically Necessary

Even though strict scrutiny is implicated, the strict scrutiny
standard is not always fatal to the government’s case, as was depicted
in Prince. Even under a standard comparable to strict scrutiny, the
Supreme Court in Prince upheld child labor regulations against a
woman who allowed her children to sell religious magazines on the
street. 274 Similarly, separating mandatory vaccinations into medically
necessary and practically necessary shows that, in the face of a
hybrid-rights claim, medically necessary vaccinations would meet
strict scrutiny analysis and practically necessary vaccinations would
not.
Medically necessary vaccinations satisfy strict scrutiny because
they meet the necessary and sufficiency standards. If a vaccine is both
necessary and sufficient, satisfying that high standard of necessity
should meet the Jacobson public necessity standard. As many courts
have found, and as the Court has expressed itself, if the law satisfies
the Jacobson standard of necessity, then it is within the government’s
police powers to enforce that law. In other words, satisfying Jacobson
satisfies strict scrutiny. Because medically necessary vaccinations meet
the Jacobson necessity standard, medically necessary vaccinations
withstand strict scrutiny.
272. See generally Lu, supra note 239, at 275–82 (for a deeper discussion of
the arguments and rationale for the colorable-plus approach).
273. For Justice Scalia’s language about the hybrid rights theory, see Emp’t
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
274. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 162 (1944).
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On the other hand, practically necessary vaccinations do not meet
the necessary and sufficiency standards and thus do not satisfy the
Jacobson necessity standard. Thus, practically necessary vaccinations
would not satisfy strict scrutiny. Therefore, when plaintiffs that bring
hybrid-rights claims, courts should grant religious exemptions from
practically necessary vaccinations but not medically necessary ones.

Conclusion: Applying the Framework and Relevant
Policy Considerations
With the recent developments in our understanding of HPV and
its vaccine, 275 legislation trying to mandate HPV vaccination has been
introduced in the majority of states—forty-one. 276 Virginia 277 and the
District of Columbia 278 have enacted HPV vaccine mandates. Texas
did as well but later revoked it. 279 Both Virginia and the District of
Columbia offer lenient exemptions at the discretion of parents.
Virginia allows religious exemptions from mandatory vaccines unless a
public health emergency or epidemic is declared. 280 The District of
Columbia has exemptions for any reason with a letter from a parent
or guardian. 281 Thus, legislatures recognize that vaccinations against
STI are a significant medical accomplishment. But significance does
not equal necessity. This Note argues that vaccines targeting STIs,
like HPV vaccines, do not fall into the category of medically necessary
vaccinations because of an assessment of the nature, communicability,
and consequences of the infection. Therefore, states should use several
policy tools to fill the gaps.
Public health agencies should use current marketing and social
networking tools to educate the public. For example, labeling HPV
vaccine as an anticancer vaccine creates a misconception. HPV
vaccine does significantly decrease the likelihood of a woman getting
275. See NCSL, supra note 2 (discussing the effects of HPV and the strains
that the vaccine effectively treats).
276. See id.
277. Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-46 (West 2011).
278. D.C. Code § 7-1651.04 (2011).
279. Lawrence O. Gostin, Commentary, Mandatory HPV Vaccination and
Political Debate, 306 JAMA 1699, 1699 (2011) (detailing 2011
presidential candidate Michele Bachmann’s challenge against adversary
Rick Perry’s executive order mandating the HPV vaccine for girls,
which the Texas legislature later revoked because of backlash from
constituents).
280. See Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-46 (describing Virginia’s statute on religious
exemptions from mandatory vaccinations).
281. See D.C. Code § 7-1651.04 (describing Washington D.C.’s statute on
religious exemptions from mandatory vaccinations).
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cervical cancer—but only cervical cancer that is closely associated
with certain types of high-risk HPVs. 282 The tight association between
HPV and cervical cancer should push states to work with drug
companies to market this vaccine as an antiviral vaccine that
prevents almost all HPV-associated cervical cancers. 283 But HPV
vaccine is a vaccine for the virus, not for the cancer. Getting the HPV
vaccine does prevent the spread of HPV. 284 However, preventing the
spread of HPV does not necessarily mean that someone will not then
get cervical cancer. 285 This is the root of the necessary and sufficient
discussion. Agencies should use updated social networking tools to
share this information so today’s youth understand that, while
receiving the HPV vaccine does significantly reduce the risk of
cervical cancer, the HPV vaccine does not target other STIs and does
not prevent all cancers. This discrepancy between association and
causation is precisely why HPV vaccine is a practically necessary
vaccination, not medically necessary vaccination.
The Internet has also drastically affected the vaccine dialogue. 286
Antivaccinationists use the Internet to spread information and garner
support for their cause. 287 The government and public health community should do the same and use social media to educate the public
about STIs and how to prevent the spread of infection. Creating
Facebook groups that offer accurate, concise, and understandable
information about what HPV is and what the vaccine does can
increase the visibility of the positive public health implications. Using
Twitter to document public health statistics regarding the HPV
growth rate would be eye-opening (and alarming) for young adults.
The vaccine narrative is an age-old issue, but the emergence of
novel biomedical technology that enhances our understanding of
diseases has added another layer of complexity to the legal analysis.
STI vaccines raise the need for different First Amendment analysis
because the diseases these vaccines target present a less compelling
governmental interest than the vaccines of Jacobson’s time, such as
smallpox. Courts currently assume that Jacobson stands for the
proposition that compulsory vaccination laws satisfy the compelling
governmental interest and this standard applies to all types of
vaccines. But the majority of decisions have overlooked the fact that
282. See Div. of STD Prevention, supra note 173, at 6 (showing tight
association between high risk HPV types and cancers).
283. See Sexually Transmitted Diseases, supra note 173.
284. See Div. of STD Prevention, supra note 173, at 6 (discussing
necessity and sufficiency between HPV and cervical cancer).
285. Id.
286. Willrich, supra note 14, at 343.
287. Id.
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new biomedical vaccines may target certain types of illnesses that do
not satisfy the compelling governmental interest test. Thus, the
government is increasing its regulatory scope in areas that are in
tension with First Amendment civil liberties—in this case, the right
to exercise one’s religion.
This Note argues that the public health analysis is currently ill
defined and needs to be updated. Once updated, a law-medicine
perspective and the constitutional hybrid-rights exception can salvage
a free exercise claim against compulsory vaccination laws. The
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the disarray of lower court decisions,
and the imprecise state statutory frameworks have led to overly broad
regulatory power. After analyzing the four potential avenues for the
scope of an exemption allowance, this Note argues that individual
civil liberties must be balanced with state police powers. After
conducting historical, policy, and legal analyses, these evaluations
show that a right to exemption from compulsory vaccination laws
should exist, even if it is not necessarily a constitutional right and
even if such a right can only exist in a limited situation.
Building upon the limited-exemption framework, this Note
advocates a three-tiered free exercise analysis that can be
extrapolated to other biomedical advances in vaccinations that have
not yet surfaced: (1) using a law-medicine analysis to categorize
vaccinations into medically necessary vaccines and practically
necessary vaccines; (2) using a constitutional analysis by applying
strict scrutiny under the hybrid rights exception, with only medically
necessary vaccines satisfying that standard and thus allowing
exemptions for only practically necessary vaccines; and (3) using
policy to fill the gaps for practically necessary vaccines, which can
include effective marketing decisions and public health tools. Thus,
the law-medicine perspective and the hybrid-rights exception
effectively salvage a limited free exercise right in the face of
compulsory vaccination laws.
Hope Lu †
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Appendix

Religious
Exemptions

Philosophic
Exemption

Var

Hep B

Hib

Polio

Statutory Source

MMR

State

DPT

Table 1. The Status of Each State’s Mandatory Vaccination Laws 288

AL

Ala. Code § 16-30-1

• • •

•

§ 16-30-3

AK

Alaska Admin. Code § 06.055

• • • •

•

§ 06.055

AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-872

• • • • •

AR

Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-702

• • •

•

CA

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120325

• • •

• •

§ 120365

CO

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-4-902

• • •

• •

§ 25-4-903

CT

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-204a

• • •

• •

§ 10-204a

DE

Del. Code Ann. tit. 14 § 131

• • •

• •

§ 14-131

DC

D.C. Code Ann. § 38-501*

• • • • • •

§ 38-506

FL

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1003.22*

• • •

• •

§ 1003.22*

GA

Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-771

• • • • • •

§ 20-2-771

HI

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A-1154

• • •

• •

§ 302A-1156

ID

Idaho Code § 39-4801

• • •

•

§ 39-4802

IL

105 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/27-8.1*

• • •

•

§ 5/27-8.1*

IN

Ind. Code Ann. § 21-40-5

• • •

•

§ 21-40-5-6*

IA

Iowa Code Ann. § 139A.8*

• • •

KS

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-5209

• • •

•

§ 72-5209

KY

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 214.034

• • •

• •

§ 214.036

LA

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:170(A)

• • •

•

§ 17:170(E)

•

ME

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 20-A § 6355

• • •

•

20-A § 6355

•

MD

Md. Code Ann. Educ. § 7-403

• • •

• •

§ 7-403

MA

Mass. Gen Laws ch. 76, § 15

• • •

• •

ch. 76, § 15

§ 15-873

•

§ 6-18 -702

•

•

*

§ 139A.8*

288. Table adapted from James G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, School
Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90
Ky. L.J. 831, 869 (2002). Updates on statutes and which exemptions are
offered adapted from States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions
from School Immunization Requirements, Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures (Dec. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabId=
14376. Asterisk indicates an update from Hodge & Gostin. Vaccine
abbreviations are as follows: DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus),
MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella), Polio (poliomyelitis) Hip
(Haemophilus influenzae type B), Hep B (hepatitis B), Var (varicella).
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MI

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.9208

• • •

• •

§ 333.9215

•

MN

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 121A-15

• • •

•

§ 121A.15

•

MS

Miss. Code Ann. § 41-23-37

• • •

MO

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 167.181

• • •

MT
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